This is the fourth article in a new weekly series on psychosocial hazard management in Australia, and its starting premise is that this is not a wellbeing topic. It is a governance one: a mature legal duty, an active enforcement record, personal officer liability, and, inside most organisations, no operating model to meet any of it. The series builds week on week, from the commercial stakes through recent prosecutions to The Psychosocial Safety Blueprint™, a proprietary executive operating model developed by Culture Plus for governing the systems that determine psychosocial safety. Subscribe on cultureplusconsulting.com. Explore our new website.
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On 2 September 2025, SafeWork NSW issued a prohibition notice to the University of Technology Sydney during a major organisational restructure.
The notice reportedly required UTS to cancel meetings involving approximately 800 employees and delay the release of its Academic Change Proposal. The regulator considered that workers were, and would be, exposed to a serious and imminent risk of psychological harm arising from actions taken and planned as part of the change process.
The notice was lifted three days later, after UTS worked with SafeWork NSW and health and safety representatives and changed aspects of how and when information would be communicated.
The intervention did not prevent UTS from making a commercial decision to restructure but it temporarily stopped particular elements of the process because of the way workers were about to be exposed to them.
For executive teams planning restructures, operating-model changes or workforce reductions, the UTS matter is an important regulatory signal. It shows that psychosocial risk is not something to be considered only after a change has caused harm. A safety regulator may intervene while the process is still underway.
The notice regulated the process, not the commercial decision
Restructures are among the most consequential decisions executive teams make. They alter roles, reporting lines, workloads, working relationships and job security, often within a very compressed period.
Yet they are still commonly governed primarily as commercial, legal and industrial processes: the business case → consultation requirements → selection and redundancy processes → communications → implementation.
The UTS matter shows why that approach is no longer sufficient. Organisational change is also a work health and safety process.
SafeWork NSW did not wait for workers' compensation claims to accumulate or for psychological harm to become a diagnosed injury. It intervened because an inspector considered that planned activity presented a serious and imminent risk.
Under the NSW WHS Act, an inspector may issue a notice where they reasonably believe an activity involves, or will involve, a serious risk to health or safety arising from immediate or imminent exposure to a hazard.
The notice does not establish that every difficult or poorly received restructure will attract regulatory action. Nor is it a court judgment creating a binding legal precedent. But it demonstrates that the prohibition-notice power is capable of being used in relation to psychosocial risk during a white-collar change process.
Organisational change is a foreseeable source of psychosocial risk
Organisational change was already regulated before the UTS notice.
WHS duties require organisations to consult workers when proposing changes that may affect their health or safety. Psychosocial risks must also be eliminated so far as is reasonably practicable or, where elimination is not reasonably practicable, minimised.
Restructures can generate or intensify multiple psychosocial hazards:
- job insecurity
- excessive or rapidly changing workloads
- poor role clarity
- inadequate support
- low job control
- poor organisational justice
- inadequate consultation
- conflict and deteriorating workplace relationships
These risks are not unexpected side effects. They are foreseeable consequences of significant change and should be managed as part of the change itself.
The duty does not begin when the announcement is made. By that point, many of the decisions determining workers' exposure have already been taken: the pace of the process, the consultation model, the sequencing of communications, the capacity available during transition, the clarity of interim responsibilities and the support provided to affected workers and managers.
This is why psychosocial controls cannot simply be added after the announcement. They need to be built into the design.
What a regulator may examine
The complete notice and SafeWork NSW's detailed reasoning do not appear to have been published through an official regulatory statement. Public reporting therefore supports caution about attributing particular findings to the regulator.
What can be said with confidence is that the WHS framework raises several clear questions for any organisation undertaking material change:
- Were the psychosocial hazards associated with the change identified before implementation?
- Were workers and their health and safety representatives consulted when the organisation was proposing changes that could affect health and safety?
- Did that consultation occur early enough to influence decisions, or only after the material features of the restructure had been settled?
- Were workload, role clarity, job control, support and organisational justice addressed through the transition period?
- Did the organisation monitor whether its controls were working?
- Were there defined points at which the process would be slowed, changed or paused if risk escalated?
These are not questions that can be delegated solely to the WHS team. The answers are largely determined by decisions made by executives, change sponsors, HR leaders and business-unit leaders — the same governance problem this series opened with.
Psychosocial controls belong before the announcement
A psychosocial impact assessment is not a prescribed statutory document. It is, however, a practical way for an executive team to demonstrate that psychosocial risk has been considered before a material change is approved.
For a significant restructure, that assessment should address:
- the baseline risk profile of affected groups
- likely impacts on workload, role clarity, job security, control and support
- the interaction between multiple hazards
- who has been consulted and how that consultation affected the process
- controls operating between announcement and completion
- the capacity and support available to managers delivering the change
- indicators that will be monitored during implementation
- thresholds that will trigger review, adjustment or pause
- the executive accountable for ensuring the controls remain effective
This does not require a new governance model. It requires the same discipline already applied to financial, legal and operational risk.
Organisations that manage psychosocial risk well during change gain more than compliance. They are more likely to preserve trust, capability and discretionary effort through the transition — the value of prevention that compliance budgets consistently miss.
The governance test
The governance question is straightforward:
Before approving material organisational change, can the executive demonstrate that the psychosocial impacts have been identified, workers have been consulted, appropriate controls have been designed and someone with sufficient authority owns the risk through implementation?
The assessment should be documented.
The controls should operate throughout the transition, not only after the new structure takes effect.
And monitoring should be capable of changing the process where the evidence shows that risk is not being adequately controlled. That is the evidence-of-effectiveness standard now shaping officer due diligence.
Next week
The first conviction of a Commonwealth employer for failing to manage psychosocial risks, and the detail in the judgment that should concern executive teams.
Download the free white paper → The Psychosocial Safety Blueprint™ — the full executive operating model.
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Solutions
- Psychosocial Hazards Consulting & Risk Assessment — independent advisory to identify, assess and control psychosocial hazards at work.
- Psychosocial Hazards & Safety Training for Leaders & Managers — leader capability under model WHS Regulations, ISO 45003 and the Positive Duty.
- Psychological Safety Training for Teams — team-level conditions that prevent psychological harm.
- Respect at Work Training for Executives & Boards — governance-level capability for officer due diligence.
This article provides general executive commentary and does not constitute legal advice. Organisations should obtain advice from qualified legal practitioners about their particular obligations and circumstances.
Sources
- SafeWork NSW prohibition notice issued to the University of Technology Sydney on 2 September 2025, as reported in public statements, parliamentary proceedings and contemporaneous media coverage. The notice was reportedly lifted on 5 September 2025 following consultation and changes to the timing and manner of communications.
- Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW), including ss 19, 47–49 and 195–197.
- NSW work health and safety regulations governing psychosocial hazards and risks, including the duties to eliminate or minimise psychosocial risks so far as is reasonably practicable.
- The Psychosocial Safety Blueprint™, Culture Plus Executive Papers No. 01, Chapter 4, "Recent Regulatory Signals".
Felicity Menzies is the CEO and Principal Consultant of Culture Plus Consulting, a specialist practice focused on building respectful, safe, and inclusive workplace cultures across corporate and government organisations in Australia. Culture Plus Consulting provides workplace culture diagnostics and tailored interventions, including trauma-informed leadership development programs, to help organisations build the capability to lead safely and effectively.